In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. 2 This statement was offered in justification of the Court's aflirmance of a judgment setting aside an indictment that had charged Colgate with an unlawful combination to establish the resale prices of its dealers. The Court emphasized that the indictment did "not charge Colgate & Co. with selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the company."
No useful purpose would be served by boring the reader with a discussion of the subsequent cases in the Supreme Court 4 except the most recent one, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 5 There a majority of six justices reversed the district court, which had dismissed the Government's complaint charging that the company had combined and conspired with its wholesalers and retailers to maintain the resale prices of its products. The district judge held that "the actions of defendant were properly unilateral and sanctioned by law under the doctrine laid down in" the Colgate case;' Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that the visits refusal to sell to price-cutters may be the only method still available in such states to a manufacturer who wishes to influence the price policy of his dealers 1 8 However, the principle of Colgate was not limited to resale price maintenance, as its language quoted above 14 indicates: It purported to establish a general freedom of customer selection,' " based on "independent discretion" and requiring only the absence of intention to create or maintain a monopoly. These more far-reaching aspects of Colgate also need exploration as to their current validity. The most appropriate beginning of our story is the fate of a private treble damage action against Parke, Davis filed by Dart Drug Corporation, one of its retailers, after the Government had won its suit against Parke, Davis. It had been established in the Government civil litigation that the unlawful conspiracy between Parke, Davis and its distributors with regard to enforcement of resale price maintenance, as a result of which sales to Dart and others had been discontinued, had occurred in the summer of 1956 and ceased thereafter.' 8 From then on Dart was able to buy Parke, Davis products without any pressure as to resale prices. But in December 1957 Dart was notified that Parke, Davis would no longer supply it directly, and subsequently Parke, Davis changed its distribution practices in such a way as to disable Dart from buying large package-sized Parke, Davis goods from wholesalers. Dart thereupon brought suit against Parke, Davis, pleading the Government judgment and alleging that the motive for the cut-off was the testimony of Dart's president in the Government's unsuccessful criminal prosecution against Parke, Davis.
I LAWFUL REFUSALS TO
Significantly, Dart did not claim that its cut-off by Parke, Davis in 1957 resulted from an agreement between Parke, Davis and others. Rather, Dart proceeded on the theory that it must be" 'presumed that the conspiracy condemned by the Supreme Court... was still in existence at the time Dart was cut off by Parke, Davis for the second time." ",1 7 On that record the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed is The agency method, i.e., selling through genuine common-law agents at prices determined by the manufacturer, sanctioned by United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) , seems to have been disapproved by Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 14 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
'"Ace
Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 1963) , cert. denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1964) .
"United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 365 U.S. 125 (g6i) (Government nevertheless entitled to judgment declaring the company had violated the law, and district court directed to retain the case on the docket for future action in the event of resumption of the conspiracy). t would be entertaining to speculate how Dart and its counsel, after this defeat based on Colgate, now react to the view that the Supreme Court in Parke, Davis had "eviscerated"' Colgate. Indeed the survival of Colgate was underscored by the additional holding that motivation of a cut-off by the desire to punish for price cutting "or anything else, however reprehensible"' 22 was not sufficient to establish illegality under section I of the Sherman Act. In this connection, the court referred with approval to the analogous recent decision of the Second Circuit in House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., ' 3 which held that a refusal to deal with a distributor in retaliation for the filing of a law suit by the latter seeking treble damages from the manufacturer for violation of the Robinson-Patman Act was not a restraint of trade but a unilateral act of "Doric simplicity" covered by Colgate. 24 Dart would, of course, have been better off if it had been able to allege and prove that its cut-off by Parke, Davis was part of an attempt to monopolize. 25 Some additional recent decisions suggest that the drawing of "demonstrable Defendant manufacturer listed its suggested retail prices in its catalogues and on price tags affixed to its merchandise. Its salesmen were instructed to advise new accounts other than department stores that full compliance with suggested retail prices was mandatory. Department stores were deemed not to need such warnings because the suggested prices reflected their normal mark-ups; defendant regularly sold to two department stores in the same city that at all times observed defendant's suggested prices. Sales clerks of these two stores received from time to time complaints from potential customers that defendant's products were available elsewhere below preticketed prices. They passed on this information, which did not identify any specific merchant, to defendant's representative who serviced their accounts. Many months later two officers of defendant visited Klein's store in the course of a survey of retailers that was undertaken "to ascertain whether the most desirable outlets were utilized in marketing." They found Klein's display unattractive and discovered his discounting activities. One week later they sent Klein notice that defendant would no longer supply him. At a subsequent meeting with defendant's executives, Klein was advised that resumption of his account was conditional upon adherence to preticketed prices; Klein refused to accede.
The district court gave Klein a judgment for treble damages and an injunction on two grounds: It held that defendant had gone beyond a simple announcement of its policy to refuse dealings with price cutters and that there was a conspiracy between defendants and the two department stores. On the first point, the district court noted that dealers were "deluged with literature" emphasizing the importance of adherence to defendant's price policy and that defendant's solicitation practices made the acceptance of a new account "tantamount to an implied promise to comply with preticketed prices." 2 This destroyed the unilateral nature of defendant's conduct. The second ground rested on a finding of "tacit understandings" between defendant and the two department stores, and the latter's "volunteered assistance in the ascertainment of noncomplying dealers." 2 The court of appeals found both grounds "clearly erroneous." In its view, the evidence established only that prospective retailers were advised of defendant's price maintenance policy, and there was no "shred of evidence" of conspiracy. There was, at most, "conscious parallelism" of action between the department stores, which was not the same as a conspiracyY This decision is an unambiguous reaffirmation of Colgate, in spite of the fact that the case was not even cited. The notion that any retailer who accepts goods for distribution with knowledge of the manufacturer's announcement as to observance of retail prices gives an implied promise to comply may be logical, but, as a general proposition, it is irreconcilable with Colgate, which allows advance announcements of the circumstances under which the manufacturer would refuse to deal. 3 ' In addition, the absence of any enforcement methods on the part of defendant was decisive. There was no effort by defendant to enlist third persons in order to detect price cutters. The two department stores had received unsolicited complaints from the public that contained not even a hint as to the identity of the price cutter. They would have acted unreasonably and against their own interest had they concealed this from defendant's representative who supervised sales to them and visited them regularly. The inspection tour by defendant's officers was not caused by these revelations and represents a natural step for a manufacturer. Klein's price cutting activities were thus discovered by defendant alone, acting through its officers in the performance of their regular duties. This is a crucial point in establishing the unilateral character of defendant's refusal.
The Klein opinion shows that facts like those involved in Colgate still happen and that the result of Colgate seems reasonable when applied to such facts unless the Colgate rule were to be replaced by the novel proposition that unilateral action in aid of maintaining resale prices violates section i of the Sherman Act. 3 2 One caveat should be added: The discussions between Klein and defendant's officers after Klein had received notice of his cut-off could be interpreted as an attempt by defendant to induce Klein to join in a resale price-fixing contract. This would not have altered the result in Klein, since such a contract was, presumably, sanctioned by Delaware law 3 3 and, therefore, exempt from federal antitrust prohibitions. 4 In states with no fair-trade laws, such a contract would be invalid. The relevance of this is to be found in the recent statement of a district court that continuation of dealings should not be conditioned on the buyer's joining with the seller in an illegal contract and that such conduct was outside the "Colgate Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) , holding that the refusals to deal with plaintiff exhibitor by several defendant distributors were based on the independent decision of each.
" Perhaps manufacturers would be well advised not to "deluge" prospective dealers with literature in order to avoid the appearance of extreme pressure. Cir. 1965) , the court observed that such an argument had not been offered, nor does it seem to have been offered in any other case. As to the pertinent policy considerations, see infra, pp. 603-04. (1964) , permits interstate enforcement of such contracts provided they are lawful in the state where the resale is to be made. Klein was a resident of Delaware.
remnant."
5 Manufacturers should consequently be cautious in offering conditions under which dealings previously terminated would be resumed, lest such negotiations, if successful, be interpreted as contracts rather than unilateral announcements.
On all fours with Klein is Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc. a0 Defendant, publisher of the Philadelphia Inquirer, raised the daily price of its paper from five cents to eight cents and announced that the paper would not be supplied to any dealer making a service charge. Plaintiff was cut off after defendant received numerous unsolicited complaints from subscribers protesting against plaintiff's service charge. The district court, citing Klein and Colgate, refused a preliminary injunction 3 7 Again, the refusal was an individual decision arrived at after discovery of the facts, and such discovery had occurred without any initiative on the seller's part and without enlistment by the seller of the help of other persons." 8 an action for trademark infringement was rejected on the authority of Colgate. Defendant was permitted to make bids for Searle products at list prices and was to collect the price from hospitals and turn 9o% of the amount collected over to Searle. The privilege was withdrawn by Searle when it learned that defendant had made bids below list price. There was no explanation of how Searle had discovered this, and the court stressed the existence of ample competition for all Searle products. 87The defendant in the Triangle case had obtained written declarations of compliance from seven dealers. The court assumed, at least for the purpose of a hearing on a preliminary injunction, that these contracts were valid under the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § § 7-11 (196o). plaintiff in order to verify the charge. Since, however, the plaintiff's competitors had volunteered this information and plaintiff had been cut off only after defendant had made an independent investigation, it would seem to be impossible to find a conspiracy with defendant. The result would have been different if defendant's agents had discussed the matter with plaintiff's competitors and assured them that defendant would select only jobbers over whose practices it could "exercise some control"; 41 such evidence would have supported a finding of a conspiracy 4 Perhaps these factual distinctions appear unduly refined or artificial. Yet, we are operating under a statute that applies only to combinations or conspiracies, "one of the most difficult areas of today's law. ' 4 3 In other words, the troublesome distinction between unilateral and conspiratorial acts was not invented by Colgate but by Congress when it framed the language of section I of the Sherman Act, and that distinction pervades the entire field of antitrust. Indeed, it reaches into the common law of torts, which holds that what is lawful if done by an individual may become unlawful if done by two or more persons acting in concert.
II TEMIINATION oF DisTRIBUToRSHiP FOR REASONS NOT INVOLVING RESALE PRICES
Since, in the absence of an attempt to achieve or maintain a monopoly, Colgate guarantees the right of customer selection, a manufacturer must be free, in so far as the antitrust laws are concerned," to replace an existing distributor with a new one regardless of the hardship for the former and even in the absence of any plausible justification. The courts have consistently so held. The ousted dealer may contend that the manufacturer's contract with the new distributor is in restraint of trade, particularly when the manufacturer substitutes for previously existing multiple dealerships an exclusive dealership, which may or may not be limited to a particular territory. This argument has been rejected when applied to manufacturers who do not enjoy monopoly positions 47 since the goods involved are subject to competition by other products and the purpose of the arrangement is to secure for the manufacturer a prospectively increasing outlet and for the distributor a reliable source of supply 4 Complications arise, however, when the individual freedom of refusing to deal may appear to collide with the policy of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 49 which prohibits leases or sales, or contracts for sale, of goods on the condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not deal in goods of a competitor of the lessor or seller if the effect of such transaction "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." This includes not only a promise of "ex. clusive dealing" by the distributor 0 but also tying arrangements, which, by definition, involve refusals to sell the tying product without simultaneous sale of the tied product. Section 3, of course, applies only to leases, sales, or contracts; the problem before us is presented by refusals to deal which occur because the distributor handles competitive goods or because he does not buy tied articles. Is such a refusal an invitation to distributors to drop competing lines or to absorb tied goods which, if accepted, becomes either a contract forbidden by section 3 of the Clayton 0 that "refusals to continue to deal unless the buyer join with the seller in a contract violative of the antitrust laws are clearly illegal." Defendant in that case bad refused to continue selling to plaintiff unless the latter agreed to purchase additional products not previously handled by him. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the ground that the tying arrangement proposed by defendant was not illegal because defendant lacked the economic power to induce his customers to take the tied product along with the tying item and the amount of commerce involved was not substantial. The fact that Judge MacMahon's doctrine was formulated in a tying case may be significant because refusal to sell except under the seller's condition (that the tied item also be bought) is the very essence of tying; therefore, the Supreme Court has sustained injunctions forbidding such refusals where sellers had found buyers willing to accept such agreements. 58 Yet, there would seem to be no reason to deny general applicability to Judge MacMahon's proposed qualification of Colgate. The right of refusal to deal is incompatible with the policy of the antitrust laws not only when it is employed to achieve or maintain a monopoly 9 but also when it is used as a means to induce contracts in restraint of trade. Such use is a misuse, which should bar the exercise of the right until the misuse is discontinued. 0 The party alleging misuse would have the burden of proving that there was an offer of a contract in violation of the antitrust laws.
A second noteworthy feature of the Motorola opinion is the absence of any comment on Motorola's business motives. Some subsequent decisions that have cited Motorola are in marked contrast. For instance, in Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 6 ' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing a judgment for an ousted dealer who had also sold Philco and Willys products in addition to the defendant's observed that plaintiff was too spread out, his efforts too dispersed, to give Hudson the effective representation as master dealer in his territory to which Hudson was entitled; that it did this under its policy ... to select master dealers who would best serve Hudson's interest; and that, having first endeavored to induce plaintiff to produce more worthwhile results, and having found that plaintiff was unable or unwilling to give it the satisfactory service it was entitled to, defendant ... simply declined to renew [plaintiff's contract]. 62 The court added that even if it were to be assumed that the contract between the parties required plaintiff not to deal in the products of other manufacturers, this could not have had the probable anticompetitive effect necessary to make out a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. 63 It follows that a refusal to renew plaintiff's contract unless he agreed to exclusive dealing would, under Judge MacMahon's doctrine, not have altered the decision in favor of defendant. Similarly, in McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 4 five discontinued retailers were unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain treble damages for violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Their contracts permitted cancellation at will on notice. Plaintiffs alleged that they had refused to drop sales of "outside" products, particularly TV sets that sold better than those of defendant. The court of appeals, affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, noted that defendant "wanted its dealers to advance sales of its merchandise, and threatened with cancellation and actually cancelled dealers who patronized its competitors to an extent which it felt jeopardized the value to it of the franchises issued to" such dealers. 65 There was thus no agreement within the meaning of section 3 of the Clayton Act but only a lawful refusal to sell; there was also no charge that defendant's goods were not available in other stores nor any averment of monopoly in any defined market. In short, these cases suggest that a non-monopolistic manufacturer, not conspiring with anyone, "has the right to select dealers who will devote their time and energies to selling his products," and that he is not compelled to retain dealers "with divided loyalties adverse to his interests." 66 The notion that a manufacturer should not be forced to continue entrusting the marketing of his products to such a dealer reflects sound business considerations. It appeared to be particularly plausible in Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., InCY 7 Plaintiffs, milk processors and distributors, handled defendant's orange juice, which accounted for three per cent of their annual business. Upon learning that plaintiffs had begun selling their own orange juice under their own private brand, defendant discontinued selling to plaintiffs on the ground that it would be business suicide to have plaintiffs treat defendant's product as second best. The denial of a preliminary injunction was justified not only on the usual grounds that a refusal to deal does not fall within the purview of section 3 of the Clayton Act but also on the further ground that section 3 could not be applied to a situation where the buyer was a competitor of the seller. 6 6, 269 F.2d 332 ( 4 th Cir. 1959).
5 1d. at 338. Accord, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC. 299 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1962). In this this case, salesmen recommended new accounts to the home office on the ground they would be "loyal," which meant that they would primarily devote themselves to the sale of Timken products. Those cancelled had bought no, or almost no, Tinken bearings for a long period. The Commission's case rested on only one witness; 37 witnesses said they were free to deal in competing products and "had actually done so to some extent." " 6 Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d x, io ( 9 th Cir. 1963). In this case, the court affirmed a judgment dismissing a counterclaim to an action for the purchase price of beer; the buyer had alleged that the seller terminated his distributorship because he, the buyer, insisted on also selling competing brands. Again, the court stressed that rival beer was not prevented from gaining a foothold in the market and that refusal is not the same as a contract. defendant was the manufacturer of a patented glass-lined silo and a patented unloader. The latter is a sweep-arm, installed inside at the bottom of the silo. After having for seven years sold the unloader separately from the silo, defendant announced that it would refuse selling unloaders unless they were to be installed in silos of its own manufacture. Plaintiff claimed treble damages, but the First Circuit accepted the defense that fifty per cent of all customers who bought defendant's unloaders for use in silos made by others had complained about unsatisfactory results in spite of defendant's educational efforts as to proper use of this equipment; this was sufficient "business justification" as a matter of law.to
On the same ground rests Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. 71 Chrysler announced that it would reduce from eighty to sixteen the number of motor carriers whose services it planned to retain, the selection to be made on the basis of past performance, financial stability, and adequacy of certificates. Dealers would no longer be free to select carriers for transportation of Chrysler cars from the plant; the retained carriers would be expected to solicit all Chrysler business. Chrysler expressed the hope that they would not increase their rates, would use Chryslerbuilt trucks, and would not enter into interchange agreements with nonretained truckers without prior approval by Chrysler. The plan, which was discussed with the retained carriers, was expected to save millions in annual shipping costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment for Chrysler holding that this was not a tying arrangement condemned by section i of the Sherman Act; in the first place, it did not fit the definition of tying, since the seller (Chrysler) did not expect to participate in the profits flowing from the sale of the tied item, i.e., the transportation service. 72 Rather "Chrysler's decision to reduce the number of motor carriers to 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964) , in which defendant's justification for cutting off sales after plaintiff had become a competitor was rejected because refusal to deal furthered an alleged conspiracy to fix and maintain price on defendant's patented drug, a major antibiotic which was obtainable only by physician's prescription. . 1958) , was comparable to the Chrysler case. There a damage action by a former dealer was dismissed; Ford's insistence that plaintiff belong and contribute to a dealers' advertising fund, which was a cooperative venture beneficial to dealers, was held reasonable. 4ccord, Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556 ( 4 th Cir. 1959). These cases do not appear to conflict with the recent decision in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) , striking down as an unfair trade practice an agreement between Atlantic and Goodyear under which Atlantic forced its service stations to buy Goodyear products, on sales of which Atlantic received commissions. Hence, the anticompetitive effect of the whom it tendered traffic was a unilateral one made by it for the sole purpose of obtaining a more efficient and economical distribution of its products . . ."' and thereby to increase its competitive strength in an oligopolistic industry. The preceding discussion of the recent cases shows that Colgate is still very much alive, although reliance on Colgate as a means to induce resale price maintenance appears to be difficult and successful only in relatively few instances, while refusals to deal motivated by other purposes are more frequently approved. In all cases such approval depends, of course, on whether the refuser can convince the court that his action was unilateral.
As already indicated, the distinction between unilateral and collaborative or conspiratorial action is fundamental in the American antitrust system and could not be done away with without altering the Sherman Act. Indeed, it is hardly necessary to call attention to the fact that at least two independent business entities 75 are required for violation of section I, while one alone may be liable under section 2. This statutory scheme reflects A philosophy that exalts the liberty and initiative of the individual enterprise and looks with suspicion on collective action. The latter is inherently dangerous because it represents aggregations of power that are likely to be used in a manner detrimental to the public interest. This is the ultimate reason for the necessity of drawing 'demonstrable demarcations" 7 6 between individual and group conduct. Such demarcations are particularly important with respect to refusals to deal because collective boycotts are presumptively illegal per se; 77 at least, they have been approved as reasonable and not inimical to competition only on very rare agreement was its principal purpose, and evidence of "economic justification" was properly rejected. 381 U.S. at 371. In the Chrysler case, there were no formal agreements with the dealers, and the economic justification of Chrysler's policy seemed paramount since Chrysler did not participate in the increased profits of the retained carriers. exclusive first-run license. Plaintiff's contention that this was a collective boycott was rejected on the ground that parallel business behavior does not conclusively establish agreement or conspiracy; since plaintiff owned a suburban theatre, with a drawing area of less than one-tenth that of the theatres in the downtown section, granting of plaintiff's request would have been so obviously an unwise business proposition that each defendant independently could not but reach the same decisions 8 Under such circumstances, courts are inclined to find a series of unilateral actions rather than a conspiracy, even when the former may have the same detrimental effect on competition as the latter. This reveals a basic weakness in the structure of the Sherman Act. 8 1
IV CONCLUSIONS
How should we evaluate the practical application of the right of unilateral refusal? As mentioned above, use of this right in furtherance of resale price maintenance is still possible, provided the detection of price cutting is accidental or unsolicited and solely the result of the manufacturer's own effort. Although several recent cases have found these requirements satisfied, 2 this cannot too easily be done. As a matter of public policy, this result is satisfactory because the manufacturer's interest in influencing resale prices does not deserve more extensive recognition and protection. The mythology of the "fair trade" laws, which permit control of such prices, has been exposed for a long time;" 3 in a truly competitive system, the manufacturer should be content to rely on the quality of his products and the efficiency of his distributors. Hence, it may be desirable to forbid even unilateral attempts at "suggesting" resale prices, but such a rule could not be derived from section i of the Sherman Act0 The cases sanctioning refusals to deal for reasons not connected with resale price maintenance concern less sensitive areas where it is much easier to find business justification for the refusal. The crucial question should always be this: What result is to be brought about by the refusal? It is settled that if it is the acquisition or retention of monopoly, the refusal is actionable. It is also suggested by what we have called Judge MacMahon's doctrine that if the refusal is intended as a means to coerce the other side into a contract violative of the antitrust laws, it should not be permitted. But not every contract which restrains the freedom of a trader is illegal; particularly, the Supreme Court has recognized in White Motor Co. v. United States, 5 and at least two circuits have since held, that restrictions on the freedom of distributors as to territories or types of customers may be reasonable when necessary to assure to a manufacturer an efficient distribution system without which he could not give battle to his competitors 86 That very same philosophy is reflected in the refusal-to-deal cases discussed above. They protect the right of manufacturers to select only those dealers who will make real efforts to push their products and to discard those who do not. That is the real meaning of the technical distinction between a refusal to deal with a distributor on 2 in addition to those cases previously discussed, see Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.2d ioog, 1o2 (7th Cir. 1965 ) (dissenting opinion of Judge Swygert). Defendant Donnelley, authorized to solicit advertisements for yellow pages of telephone directory, refused to deal with plaintiff's advertising agency. A treble damage action under § § x and 2 of the Sherman Act was dismissed. The dissent would have-correctly, I believe-reversed on the ground of monopoly effect of telephone advertising. See also Azzee Supply Corp. v. Ruberoid Co., 222 F. Supp. 237 (D. Conn. 1963) , where there was a compliant of conspiracy by an ousted Ruberoid dealer, who alleged that two of plaintiff's competitors, but not Ruberoid, were members of a conspiracy; no group boycott was found, since the refusal to deal was on the part of Ruberoid alone. the one hand and a contract obligating him to refrain from dealing in competing products on the other; such contracts are, of course, illegal only when they may have the requisite anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. 8 7 A manufacturer should, therefore, be free to refuse renewal of franchises when he cannot count on identity of interest with his dealers. Under such circumstances, the competitive order is not endangered but likely to be enhanced by permitting the manufacturer to insist that his dealers consider his products as their primary responsibility. The dealers will do this anyway if the product is attractive enough.
All told, the recent cases surveyed here seem to achieve fairly workable guidelines in protecting the freedom of individual traders from unnecessary restrictions and in recognizing conduct likely to increase competitive efficiency 88 And, curiously enough, it is all done with the aid of that old case that had to be rescued from the undertaker.
